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A POLITICAL HISTORY 
F THE WELTBUHNE AND ITS CIRCLE 
"Mr. Deak's work supplies an excellent, straightforward 
nt of the Weltbiihne campaigns against national- 
onservatism and fascism."-Nation 
$9.75 
u ~ I ~ E R S I T Y  OF CALIFORNIA PRESS 
TWENTY YEARS UP 
SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT 
WAYNE 5. VUClNlCH 
CONTEMPORARY 
YUGOSLAVIA 
TWENTY YEARS OF 
SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT 
Multinational, multiconfessional Yugo- 
slavia, encompassing within her boun- 
daries regions varying in geography, cul- 
ture, and economic development, has 
been a persistent challenge to Soviet 
Communism. She has been involved in 
most international political crises in the 
years following World War II, and has 
been a staunch supporter of the United 
Nations. Her leader, Marshal Josip Broz 
Tito, has been denounced by China, the 
Soviet Union, and the West. Yet Yugo- 
slavia has repeatedly derived financial 
and political benefits from both East and 
West. 
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of an important theoretical variation on 
Marxism, expulsion from the Cominform, 
and decentralization of government. 
Background for these topics is provided 
by historical essays describing the com- 
plex events before and during World War 
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Constitutional privileges for Yugoslavia's 
nationalities have been broadened, but 
their political activities are still hedged 
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less, the contributors-all of them experts 
in their subject areas - conclude that 
today Yugoslavia is stronger, stabler, 
more prosperous, and more respected 
than ever before. 
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Yugoslavia: Modernization in 
an Ethnicallv Diverse State 
JOEL M. HALPERN 
T H E  Belgrade-Sarajevo Express usually does not stop in the small Bosu,a,, 
town of Maglaj, but passengers looking out the window cannot fail to 
notice the paper-products factory. Its huge chimneys belching acrid smoke 
repeat the form of the medieval fortress towers on a nearby wooded hill 
and the soaring minarets of mosques clustered below. The train passes 
through Maglaj as the factory shifts are changing, and off-duty workers in 
blue cotton jackets with the factory name Natronka embroidered on the 
breast pocket wait with their bicycles at the railroad crossing while the 
Express goes by. 
Many of them live in the adjacent Moslem villages. Others pedal a few 
miles further into town. For those who come from Orthodox villages in 
the surrounding hills, the long trip home is made only over Sundays. They 
take a road along the River Bosna to the point where a bridge connects 
the old and new parts of town. The Old Town is dominated by an im- 
pressive mosque (soon to be registered as a cultural monument intended 
for state preservation). Steep, winding streets converge on a compact, 
cobbled marketplace rimmed by wooden stalls and shops that give the two- 
dimensional effect of a stage set. On market days the place is thronged with 
villagers from various ethnic groups who have come in from the country- 
side, each group readily identifiable by its distinctive dress. Ironware 
Material in this article is based in part on research carried out in Yugoslavia in 
1961-1962 and 1964 under grants from the National Science Foundation and the 
Department of State. It also draws on data from the author's 'Yugoslav Peasant 
Society in Transition: Stability in Change" (Anthropological Quarterly, July 
1g63), "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia" (Human Organization, 
Summer 1965). and A Serbian Village (Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1967). 
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wrought by itinerant Gypsy smiths is displayed on the cobbles alongside 
peasant baskets of h i t  or spice-sellers' mounds of brick-red ground pa- 
prika. At an outdoor coffeehouse overhanging the river, men in fezzes sit 
with their pipes and small cups of thick Turkish coffee and contemplate 
the water. The river is now polluted by wastes from a large steel mill up- 
stream, and the slightest breeze carries sulfurous fumes from the paper 
factory. 
The factory smell is even stronger in the flat New Town across the river, 
where an ordered grid settlement has been laid out within the past fifteen 
years. Here are rows of modern workers' flats, district administrative offices, 
a new school, a fine soccer field, a health station, a bank, and modern shops, 
including a new supermarket frequented with curiosity and trepidation by 
village women. Here, too, is the Orthodox church and smaller Catholic 
church. The center of activity on the new side is the so-called workers' 
University, with meeting rooms and movie hall, and the adjacent hotel and 
cafe, where the specialty of the house is young lamb roasted whole on an 
outdoor spit. From this vantage point, town officials sit in the evening and 
look out across the Bosna to the silhouette of the fortress towers, speculat- 
ing on how tourism might be induced if they were to dramatize the ancient 
architecture with colored spotlights. 
Maglaj exemplifies the Yugoslav modernization process in miniature: 
ethnic diversity, small medieval and modern urban complexes side by 
side, state ownership and private enterprise, and the omnipresent advan- 
tages and disadvantages of industrialization in a small town. 
I t  is important at the outset to distinguish modernization from social 
and cultural change, particularly as it applies to Yugoslavia. Moderniza- 
tion, as defined in this chapter, is the specific process of social and cultural 
change associated with the development of an industrialized economy. 
Thus the changes associated with phenomena such as population migra- 
tions, the development of towns, changes in religious value systems, oc- 
cupational specialization, and centralized states need not be and indeed 
have not been in the past history of the Balkans linked with the process of 
modernization. Modernization is not to be thought of as a time of great 
change associated with an earlier period of minimal change. For example, 
during the period of the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, there were large 
population movements, mostly into mountain refuge areas. As Turkish 
influence waned in the early nineteenth century, many people began to 
emerge from the mountains and take up life in valley and plains areas, 
often by clearing the forest. This transition from a pastoral to a mixed 
farming economy may not seem as dramatic a transformation to us as the 
rising of mighty industrial complexes today, but surely it made a great 
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impact on the individuals involved. Government intervention in the lives 
of individuals is not new. I n  areas such as Croatia and Dalmatia, even 
before the onset of the industrial revolution, the government was assessing 
taxes by measuring the size of houses and the square area of each of the 
rooms in a village house. 
What is new in Yugoslavia, as in the rest of the world, is the totality, 
universality, and irreversibility of the process. Modernization is more than 
simply a matter of universalizing tractors and electric lights in the villages, 
and factories and apartment houses in the towns. I t  is more than extending 
government services in health, education, and welfare to all. These are, of 
course, parts of the process, and Yugoslavia, as a modern state and, more 
specifically, a Communist state committed to an intensive program of in- 
dustrialization, takes particular pride in the increase in the quantitative 
indices of modernization, whether they be a greater steel output or an 
increase in literacy. There are, however, other more subtle and more im- 
portant problems of concern to those interested in the evolution of civili- 
zations. This discussion will focus specifically on the effects of moderni- 
zation on the village and town and upon subsequently changing social 
patterns. 
Demographic, Economic, and Ethnic Background 
A look at settlement and occupation patterns is basic to an understanding 
of what is happening in Yugoslavia. There are eight cities with a popula- 
tion of ioo,ooo or more, and these centers contain only g percent of the 
country's population (1961). With the exception of Albania this distribu- 
tion is the lowest in Europe. There are seven cities over 50,000 but under 
ioo,ooo with 2.8 percent of the population. Over 77 percent of the people 
live in communities of io,ooo or less (the highest rate in Europe, again 
with the exception of Albania, which has 78.8 percent in this category). 
The town of Maglaj is among these latter communities. I n  spite of this 
pattern of population distribution, Yugoslavia surpasses in per capita in- 
dustrial output countries such as Italy, Chile, Japan, and Argentina, which 
have proportionately much greater urban concentrations.1 
While a significant concentration of industry is in the capital cities of 
the republics, particularly in and around Belgrade and Zagreb, much in- 
dustry is located in small towns. Examples are the main steel-producing 
centers of Zenica (population, 44,184). Sisak (26,647), Jasenice (15,726), and 
NiUiC (20,166), which are located in four of the six constituent republics 
of Yugo~lavia.~ Zenica alone produces more than half the total Yugoslav 
raw steel and 60 percent of its pig iron and coke. Yet even here peasant 
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farms cover the slopes of the hills that encircle the mills, and a rural set- 
ting surrounds the grime and smells of the steel town. 
I n  Belgrade, rapidly expanding suburbs on both sides of the Danube 
are beginning to obscure the countryside. Still, from any point in the 
capital city it is only a few minutes' drive to the lime whitewashed villages 
of the Vojvodina plains or to the scattered tile-roofed cottages in the hills 
of Sumadija-except, of course, when there is a traffic jam. The close re- 
lationship to the countryside is a very real thing. About half of Yugo- 
slavia's industrial workers live in rural areas and commute, often long 
distances. As of 1960, approximately 48 percent of rural income was de- 
rived from nonagricultural work.3 Out of a total population of almost 
18,500,ooo for that year, over 12,500,000 are listed as residing on agricul- 
tural holdings of some sort. Of these, more than 2,500,000 are active males, 
over half of whom have employment of some kind outside the farm.4 The 
total working force in manufacturing is listed as 1,074,ooo; 2,272,000 are 
engaged in economic production of all sorts.5 Almost a third of all private 
agricultural holdings have someone employed full time off the land. These 
workers do not by any means come only from dwarf holdings; more than 
25 percent of them live on farms of four hectares or over, and, as Table 1 
indicates, the so-called mixed (peasant-worker) households possess almost 
one third of all agricultural land. 
In  Yugoslavia the average household size is 4.0 (compared with 3.1 for 
the United Kingdom, 2.8 for Sweden, 3.9 for Portugal). Approximately one 
third of the population lives in households of six or more p e ~ p l e . ~  Yugo- 
slavia, then, is a country of people living mainly on farms or in small towns 
and in relatively large family units, with variations, of course, according 
to geography and ethnic makeup. 
There has also been substantial growth in the index of industrial pro- 
duction, from 172 in 1950 (1939 is calculated as loo) to 391 in 1959.~ In  
1936, of the total of 741,713 individuals listed as wage earners, only 374,170 
were workers in industry. I n  1921, 76 percent of all household heads were 
farmers, and lo  percent were listed as workers.8 What appears to be a low 
degree of urbanization actually represents a relatively great increase over 
the past several decades. Table 2 summarizes the approximately fourfold 
increase in size in most of the main cities in as many decades. Given the 
small size of cities in prewar Yugoslavia, i t  is apparent that the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the present working force resident in cities today has fairly 
recently come from villages. From 1949 to 1960, some 2,162,000 people 
left their villages? The extremely crowded housing conditions found in all 
Yugoslav urban areas, originally due largely to wartime destruction but 
today mainly the result of migration, have resulted in the building of pri- 
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vate homes on the outskirts and in some cases the Yugoslav equivalent of 
shanty towns where i t  is possible to maintain rural habits to a greater ex- 
tent than in modern apartment buildings. These factors constitute some 
of the critical demographic and economic variables in the process of social 
change in Yugoslavia. 
Returning to Maglaj for a moment, another variable is apparent: the 
ethnic differences symbolized by the mosques and churches in close prox- 
imity but in separate quarters of the small town. The very name of this 
multinational state means Land of the South Slavs. I n  six republics cover- 
ing an area of 98,740 square miles, or approximately the size of Wyoming, 
existing national differences are explicitly recognized by the government. 
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are, in that order, largest in 
size and population; Macedonia is larger in area but slightly smaller in 
population than Slovenia, and Montenegro is smallest both in area and 
population. The geographic position of Yugoslavia, bordering on Italy, 
Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic 
Sea, helps to explain the widely varying influences, from Rome and By- 
zantium to the Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian empires, and, since 1948, 
between Eastern and Western blocs, to which Yugoslavia has been subject 
throughout her turbulent history. 
There is enormous variety in terrain, ranging from that of the coastal 
strip with its Mediterranean climate and vegetation to the continental 
Pannonian basin. Yugoslavia is to a considerable extent a mountainous 
country, but almost a third of its territory is less than 600 feet above sea 
level. Twenty-five percent lies between 600 and 1,500 feet. There are a 
number of important lowlands along the middle Danube and areas of 
broad valleys between hills and mountains in Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia, 
and Croatia. About 25 percent of the land is over 3,000 feet. Forming the 
backbone of Yugoslavia are the craggy limestone ridges paralleling the 
coast, which at best support scattered herding. The Julian Alps in Slovenia 
and the mountains extending further inland through Bosnia support 
mixed economies with herding and forestry predominant. There are strik- 
ing differences such as between the karst and mountains of Montenegro, 
where only I I percent of the land is arable, and the flat and fertile Vojvo- 
dina where 86 percent is arable. The dairy herds on Slovenia's alpine mead- 
ows strongly contrast with water buffalo in the rice fields of Macedonia. 
Serbia has two autonomous areas: the Vojvodina which contains Hun- 
garian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Romanian minority groups among others, 
and Kossovo-Metohija, known as the Kosmet, which is populated mainly 
by Albanians, most of whom are Moslems. The Serbs proper, Monte- 
negrins, and most Macedonians are Orthodox. The Slovenes and Croats 
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are Catholic. Most Yugoslav Moslems live in Bosnia, and significant Al- 
banian and Turkish Moslem groups are found in Macedonia. According 
to the 1953 census, there were approximately 2,000,000 Moslems in all of 
Yugoslavia, as compared with more than 5,000,000 Catholics, 7,000,ooo 
Orthodox, and 2,000,000 listed without affiliation. 
Slovenes and Croats use the Latin alphabet; Serbs, Macedonians, and 
Montenegrins use the Cyrillic. Bosnia, with its central position and mixed 
population of the three major groups, employs both. Slovene and Mace- 
donian are separate Slav languages, the former largely unintelligible to 
speakers of Serbo-Croatian, the main language of Yugoslavia. Aside from 
differences in alphabets, there are a number of vocabulary and accent dif- 
ferences between Serbian and Croatian but no real problem in mutual 
comprehension. 
Official ethnic distinctions for census purposes tend to confuse more than 
to clarify. For example, in the 1931 census the term "Yugoslav" was em- 
ployed for both Serbs and Croats, but this forced superficial unity was 
subsequently dropped, and in the postwar period the designations of the 
newly formed republics (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
were used. Serbs and Montenegrins have a common heritage, and con- 
temporary differences are based in large part on specific ecological adapta- 
tions to open-field agriculture as opposed to a primarily pastoral economy. 
Some Montenegrins migrated to more fertile lowlands in Serbia and Bosnia 
after the Turkish withdrawal and thus became the ancestors of many now 
classified as Serbs. I n  the prewar Serb-dominated government, Macedonia 
was referred to as South Serbia, and today's Macedonians are mainly 
oriented toward Serbia. In  Bosnia, Catholics generally declare themselves 
as Croats and Orthodox as Serbs, with the Moslem segment listing them- 
selves as of undeclared or Yugoslav nationality. I n  the 1953 census, 85,000 
Gypsies are listed; some authorities believe the actual number to be higher 
since many are known to have declared themselves as Serbs or Macedonians. 
There are many Serb and mixed Serb-Croat villages in Croatia despite 
the massacre of local Serbs during the last war by the Fascist-led Ustashe, 
composed of fanatic Croat nationalists. The Vojvodina, populated mainly 
by Serbs and foreign minority groups, also has villages of Croat origin. 
Since the war many Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and even Macedonians 
have come to the area to occupy villages deserted by former German 
inhabitants. 
Unlike the prewar situation, many ethnic minorities are now officially 
recognized, with elementary schools and sometimes high schools that use 
their own language. On the university level, however, only Serbo-Croatian, 
Slovene, and Macedonian are employed, causing special language situa- 
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tions, such as that of an Albanian from Macedonia who attended a local 
Albanian elementary school, went on to a Macedonian-speaking high 
school, and finally to a Serbian university. Serbo-Croatian is the only lan- 
guage used in the army, so that male villagers of non-Serbo-Croatian groups 
usually have some command of that language. 
Each group has associated stereotypes: Serbs are emotionally untrust- 
worthy but are outgoing and hospitable; Montenegrins are heroic, prefer 
to direct rather than to work; Macedonians are backward but have won- 
derful music; Slovenes and Croats are clannish, unemotional, hard- 
working. Most resentment seems to be directed toward the Slovenes; 
Slovenia is the most homogeneous republic, with the highest degree of in- 
dustrialization and best standard of living in Yugoslavia. 
Another point of division is based on differing historic traditions. Croats 
and Slovenes tend to venerate their former association with central Europe 
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and look down upon those "Balkan" 
areas which were under Turkish rule. "Almost five hundred years under 
the Turks" is often offered as the pat explanation for underdevelopment by 
inhabitants of those areas which were part of the Ottoman Empire. 
Despite the way in which urban construction has surrounded and grown 
up within cities in former European and Turkish areas, gradually obliterat- 
ing much of their former distinctiveness, the earlier flavor has not been 
entirely eliminated from the urban scene. In  the old towns of Zagreb and 
Ljubljana, church, castle, and town square strongly persist. Before the 
1963 earthquake, in Skopje, Turkish tradition was apparent everywhere in 
the old town, with its twisting cobbled streets, mosques, baths, and cara- 
vansary. I n  Sarajevo much of this still remains. Parts of the old bazaar 
have been preserved for the tourist trade, side by side with the monu- 
mental administrative buildings built later by the Austrians. 
Table 2 shows how these legacies are manifested in the economic and 
social structural distinctions among the republics. Differences have per- 
sisted from postwar years to the present. The proportion of salaried women 
is notable. The Kosmet, with over 5 percent of the total population, has 
only slightly more than 1 percent of such women, while in Slovenia the 
figure is double their proportion in the total population. Similar dispari- 
ties are reflected in the proportions of total salaried employment, number 
of economic organizations and students, and the demographic data also 
presented in Table 3. Generally the Kosmet is lowest or most underde- 
veloped in all indices while Slovenia is at the other end of the scale; Croatia 
and Serbia are somewhat above the average, and the remaining republics 
are under average, although the order varies with the index used. 
Separating the developed from the underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia 
is at best a complex business, and republic divisions only serve as a very 
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general guide. A Yugoslav journalist's summary of this problem from a 
semiofficial viewpoint is illuminating: 
An uneven division of productive forces has been known to exist in this 
country for a long period of time. The reasons can be found in the fact that 
the economic and social life of the country existed only at the periphery of 
imperial Austria and Turkey, and that this situation remained unchanged in 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This means that the situation of regional dispro- 
portion existed before and that it was imposed on the new society as a primary 
factor determining further economic development. Though much has changed 
lately and despite a complete change that came about in some areas, a pro- 
nounced imbalance is still present . . . We will probably not make a mistake if 
we draw a line dividing relatively developed from relatively underdeveloped 
territory . . . underdeveloped areas exist south of the Sava and Danube . . . the 
Federal Social Plan 1961-65 labelled as underdeveloped: Macedonia, southern 
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and one part of southern Croatia. 
South of the line there are 8.7 industrial enterprises per 1,000 square kilometers, 
while north of the line there are 28.2 industrial enterprises per 1,000 square 
kilometers. In the south there are 13.5 enterprises per loo,ooo people, while 
in the north there are 31.2. South of the line is 41 percent of the territory of 
Yugoslavia and 6.3 million people whose national income is about 50 percent 
smaller than that of the population living north of the line.10 
Definition of Rural and Urban in the Yugoslav Context 
Two aspects of the impact of industrialization in Yugoslavia are worth 
noting: urbanization of the village, and its counterpart, peasantization of 
the town. Such terms suggest the possibility of the emergence of a new, 
more uniform national synthesis, one which would tend to minimize, i f  
indeed not eliminate, rural-urban differences. However, this problem has 
several dimensions. Peasant life is being reformulated and, perhaps, for 
certain pastoral groups even terminated, while urban life patterns are for 
the most part only being modified.11 
The peasant and the village are experiencing the most radical change, 
although forces of industrialization and modernization broadly defined, 
originating in the city, have, of course, altered the nature of urban life as 
well. This is particularly striking in Yugoslavia, where traditional and con- 
temporary sections of town often exist side by side in many larger centers 
and also in smaller places like Maglaj. Urban life, encompassing a certain 
amount of diversity, has been able to incorporate change, but in the village 
change has impinged from without and is absorbed with greater difficulty 
into existing patterns. Preindustrial cities which were craft or mining 
centers have adjusted to industrialization more easily than towns which 
functioned primarily as religious or even trade centers. Those rural areas 
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which have had a craft tradition or cottage industry make the transition 
more easily that those dependent exclusively on farming. There has been 
a change from the days of the preindustrial city; the countryside has in- 
creasingly lost its autonomy and its ties with the past. I n  contrast, urban 
traditions are venerated, whether in universities, art galleries, or archi- 
tectural monuments. The same cannot be said for rural material culture 
and traditions; there are folk-dance groups and ethnographic museums, 
but these are distinctly a matter of secondary importance. 
I t  is necessary to define the key terms "peasant," "village," "urban," and 
"town" in the Yugoslav context. Without going into the cross-cultural 
complexities, peasant life in Yugoslavia may reasonably be defined as a 
subculture of which the essential feature is a tenitordally based relationship 
,&p among familial units, either extended or unclear, and the land they culti- 
' vate mainly with their own labor. This rel&onship has continuity through 
time. The term also implies the association of these familial units in po- 
litical, social, and economic units called villages. All members of this so- 
ciety need not practice agriculture as their primary occupation nor need 
they reside continuously in the village, so long as their main social and 
economic ties remain there. Migration of individuals or family groups is 
possible from one peasant community to another. The peasant is also a 
member of the national state, to which he must contribute services in labor, 
in kind or in cash, and from which he receives, as a minimum, some form 
of protection of his life and property against external and internal threats. 
Obviously, the variation within this framework has been enormous, par- 
ticularly in forms of familial organization, diversity of occupations sub- 
sidiary to agriculture, and the peasant-state relationship. The last ranges 
from minimum regulation where the state requires only that its demand 
for taxes, labor, and military service be met, to situations in which many 
details of internal village organization and family relationships are cen- 
trally regulated.12 
I n  casual accounts of modernization, the temptation is to present a pic- 
ture of the untouched village as contrasted with the dynamic town. But the 
village has been the scene of enormous change. Obviously there is more 
continuity with the past in areas where peasant families with small hold- 
ings have lived for generations than there is in a new industrial settlement. 
Yet change is apparent. I n  Serbia, for example, over a period of a century 
and a half there has been a sequence of five distinct rural house types. Not 
only do these house types reflect changing patterns of need, comfort, and 
planning (the most recent follows a standardized plan devised by urban 
architects and utilizes concrete and steel reinforcing rods), but they reflect 
drastically altered ecological patterns, such as the virtual disappearance of 
the forests in central Serbia. 
I n  the period 1951-1960, total dwelling space in rural areas rose by 11 
percent. I n  proportion to the number of inhabitants, housing construction 
has grown even faster in the countryside than in towns. (In absolute terms, 
however, i t  has progressed at a greater rate in urban communities. Since 
1949, the urban population has increased by over two million while the 
rural and farming population has decreased by about a half million).'s 
Military service both during a war and in peacetime has been almost 
universal. Because of the large number of army units based throughout 
Yugoslavia, today as in prewar times most peasant recruits get the oppor- 
tunity to see places remote from their homes. Since the units are often 
mixed, the village youth meets young men from widely varying regions. 
Few village men (in contrast to women) lack some degree of knowledge 
beyond the confines of their own district. Those from poorer regions, par- 
ticularly, become keenly aware of differences in living standards. 
The peasant population incorporated a significant portion of the 
ideology of the Partisan movement, even while resenting postwar attempts 
at collectivization. The rural population has associated with or attributed 
to this movement many of the changing aspects of life in the twentieth 
century. A key case in point is the changed role of women. (Many women 
were Partisans, most of them originally from towns, and village women 
joined their ranks.) There is also anticlericalism, a feature present in the 
Croatian peasant movement before the war but linked more closely with 
the Partisans and their rejection of religion. These two attitudes provoked 
hostility as well as covert acceptance. The most important new attitude, 
however, is the very strong emphasis on industrialization as the pathway 
to national salvation and a better way of life and, with this, the explicit 
negation of village life. These sentiments are shared by village people 
despite the negative self-images they invoke. 
I n  Yugoslavia, where so many people who dwell in the countryside work 
outside their holdings, there is inevitably a certain degree of arbitrariness 
in determining a household's main source of income. However, urban as 
opposed to rural, or town as contrasted with village, implies a primarily 
nonagricultural focus of economic activities and further, in contrast to the 
rural pattern, greater occupational differentiation. In  addition, there is a 
greater variety of ethnic groups than is usually found in the homogeneous 
countryside. The town is also a center of trade, and of governmental, po- 
litical, industrial, and religious activities. I t  should be emphasized that 
calling a particular community urban or rural conceals vast diversities. 
Belgrade is urban, and so is Maglaj. The large, densely settled, prosperous 
wheat-growing communities in the Vojvodina are rural as are isolated 
pastoral communities scattered over the Montenegrin karst. 
Table 4 clearly shows that size alone is not an indicator of urbanness in 
the traditional sense. The outstanding example is, of course, the Vojvo- 
dina, where almost half the population in the one town over l00.000 is 
listed as agricultural, and almost a third in towns Erom 20,000-50,000 is 
listed in the same category. This particular phenomenon dates back to the 
time of the Turkish conquest when the agricultural population was clus 
tered in large settlements for protection on the open plains. I t  should be 
noted that some of these larger communities have decreased in size in 
recent years, because of administrative changes in boundaries, as a result 
of which their agricultural sectors are now listed separately.14 Approxi- 
mately one fifth of the population of towns from 20,000-50,000 in the 
Kosmet and in Macedonia is listed as agricultural. In  all republics, at least 
lo  percent or more of the population of towns between lo,ooo and 20,000 
is agricultural, two important exceptions being Slovenia, long under Aus- 
trian domination, with an old urban and industrial tradition, and Monte- 
negro, at the other extreme, where no urban tradition existed until the 
twentieth century. 
Almost all the larger settlements have histories going back to Roman 
times and progressing through the period of medieval kingdoms to the 
Turkish conquest, when these towns were military garrisons, administra- 
tive centers, or the site of caravansaries on the important overland route 
linking the Dalmatian Coast with Turkey. Some were mining centers, and 
on the Dalmatian Coast a number of towns, notably Dubrovnik, became 
important ports. Belgrade and Zagreb have long histories. Belgrade's popu- 
lation in the nineteenth century was significantly less than it had been 
I some centuries earlier. Before the nineteenth century, the rise and fall of 
urban populations in the Balkans was a common phenomenon related to 
the fortunes of war, epidemics, and changing trade patterns. The nine- 
teenth century emergence of Serbia as a peasant state was a direct conse- 
quence of the withdrawal of the Turks and other ethnic groups who had 
dominated the administrative and commercial life of the towns. Serbia's 
I lack of trained manpower and investment capital also resulted in her 
I general exclusion from the industrial revolution occurring throughout Eu- 
rope during this period. The founder of the Serbian dynasty which ruled 
Yugoslavia (with interruptions) until the Second World War was the famed 
I Karageorge, a prosperous livestock merchant from central Serbia who led the first revolt against the Turks in 1804. 
I n  the late nineteenth century the territory now occupied by Yugoslavia 
was almost entirely rural. Belgrade and Zagreb had only 15,000 people 
(1867) and 20,000 (1869) respectively. Serbia remained very much a peasant 
I state up to the First World War, at which time almost go percent of the 
I 






towns and in Belgrade itself, a significant proportion of the urban popula- 
tion were craftsmen oriented toward rural trade or produce merchants 
involved in the sale or export of various agricultural products. Most of 
these merchants and craftsmen were themselves of rural origin. 
In  Serbia around the turn of the century, 126 separate crafts were prac- 
ticed. These occupied over 33,000 craftsmen and almost 22,000 appren- 
tices.l5 For 1900, a total of 3,200 "workers" is listed, a figure which increased 
to 16,000 in 1910. Industrial enterprises were extremely small, employing 
an average of 21 workers in lgoo and 34 in ~glo. '~ 
I n  the late 19209s, for eighteen of the principal towns of Serbia (not 
including Belgrade) with a total population of 247,000, the following were 
listed: 4,361 stores; 4,127 craftsmen's shops; roo banking establishments; 
and 142 industrial enterprises (the latter were given broad definition, in- 
cluding 51 flour mills, 18 brickyards, and 8 power plants), in addition to 
the relatively small industries which were almost exclusively linked to agri- 
culture and local consumption needs-breweries, food processing, textile 
and shoe plants.l7 
If it is assumed that each store or shop supported a family of five in- 
cluding the owner, and allowing in addition for one assistant or apprentice, 
this accounts for more than 50,000 people or about one fifth the urban 
population, leaving aside those employed in the banks and industrial con- 
cerns as well as administrators, civil servants, and the farmers who lived 
within town limits. 
The transformation has been drastic. The town of NiS, for example, in 
1928 with a population of 38,000 had 500 stores and shops. I n  1963 the 
population was almost 85,000, and 364 stores with 1,440 employees are 
listed."-' 
In  all republics, with the possible exception of Slovenia and certain 
coastal towns, there are few townspeople who cannot trace a rural origin 
two or, at most, three generations away. Urban population has grown as a 
result of net migration as well as natural increase. During the prewar 
period, for which two census years are available (1921 and 1931), natural 
increase in the urban population is estimated at 242,000 and the net urban 
migration in the same decade at 314,000. I n  the first postwar census years 
(1948 and 1953). natural increase amounted to 216,000 and net migration 
to 430,000.'~ 
A notable characteristic of this migration is that the new workers fre- 
quently bring with them certain of their rural traits. This is vividly illus- 
trated in the growing towns of central Serbia, a region given particular 
industrial impetus since the war. I n  addition to new urban construction, a 
striking feature is the already large and increasing number of new private 
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houses on the outskirts. Usually substantial brick and concrete structures, 
they are identical inside and out to new houses one sees in villages. The 
whitewashed kitchen, with its wood stove, remains the focal point of the 
three- or four-room house. The kitchen invariably contains a bed covered 
with a handloomed rug, used as a couch for visitors during the day and by 
young children or an older relative for sleeping at night. A so-called guest 
room, rarely used, is set aside for storage and display of choice items of 
handiwork, and its walls are adorned with photographs of ancestors and 
other relatives. There is no indoor plumbing, the water supply coming 
from a well or, less often, from a shared outdoor tap. Chickens wander in 
and out of the kitchen. I n  the yard a pig may be kept, although recently 
attempts have been made to ban pigs within town limits. Favorite village 
flowers usually bloom in front of the dwelling, and behind i t  may be a 
small vegetable garden and some young fruit trees. 
Yugoslav investigators favor an economic explanation for this phenom- 
enon because urban food supplies still tend to be somewhat irregular and 
expensive. T o  quote a prominent party member: 
Much has been done to raise the general standard of living in our country, 
but it seems there has been a lag in the standard of living of workers, especially 
in the lower paid categories . . . In the middle of last year almost half of the 
workers were receiving an income below 25,000 dinars; with these resources, 
especially with an income below 20,000 dinars, it is difficult to meet needs in 
food, clothing and shelter, and to maintain and educate a child with a children's 
allowance, which has lost a great deal of its real value . . . with present personal 
incomes of workers in cities and industrial centers, those who do not have land 
and a house are faring worst. About 70 to 75 percent of the family budget is 
spent for food and shelter, and a family of a poorer paid worker spends about 
85 percent of its income for these items. An increase in salaries, particularly in 
the lower categories, can barely cover the rise in prices because the prices of 
food and rent rise fastest. The higher paid categories can adjust to the jump 
of prices by changing the structure of their consumption and they are less 
sensitive to the increase.20 
Another view of the rural-urban shift appears in a survey conducted in 
1960 by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade. Industrial workers 
with various qualifications in all parts of the country, a total of 5,012, were 
studied. They worked in 255 different concerns, both large and small, 
located in towns of various sizes, including enterprises in industry, mining, 
construction, and public transportation. Relationships were established 
between degree of skills, previous education, occupation of parents, and 
amount of land held. Those who had worked in the village on their family 
holdings before becoming workers, 39 percent of the total sample, com- 
posed 16 percent of the highly skilled workers, 27 percent of the skilled, 46 
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percent of the semiskilled, and 55 percent of the unskilled workers. As 
might be expected, the largest groups of highly skilled and skilled workers, 
49 percent and 38 percent respectively, had some sort of formal technical 
education. Significantly, the fathers of 3,085 of the workers surveyed were 
farmers as opposed to 940 whose fathers were workers or craftsmen. Ten 
percent of the 3,085 were highly skilled workers, and 24 percent were skilled 
workers, as contrasted with 28 percent of the sons of workers who became 
highly skilled workers and 31 percent who became skilled workers. These 
figures indicate a problem of mobility for the sons of peasants. Those who 
had attained the greatest skills had given up their association with the 
land. Of the total workers surveyed, 55 percent owned no land at all, but 
71 percent of the highly skilled workers and 60 percent of the skilled work- 
ers had no land as opposed to 52 percent of the semiskilled workers and 45 
percent of the unskilled workers.2' 
A very significant proportion of the white-collar class is also of peasant 
origin. Of office workers with elementary schooling, 55 percent are from 
villages, as are 32 percent of those with middle and higher schooling and 
37 percent of executive personnel.22 
Changing Social Relationships 
I n  discussing how village life is being reformulated and urban life modified 
-and the significance of subsequent urbanization of the village and peas- 
antization of the town-a number of important categories of change must 
be considered. These include the nature and structure of social relation- 
ships within the household and the family and among household groups, 
forms of political and economic organization beyond the kinship unit, and 
their relationships to the ultimate unit, the national state; the physical and 
material settings in which these groups operate are the values by which 
people evaluate their situations. 
An obvious bench mark against which to measure change in these cate- 
gories is the line between the prewar and postwar periods. T o  gain per- 
spective, it is necessary to look back approximately a century before the 
war, at which time urban life was, as has been shown, relatively little de- 
veloped and the majority of the people in all areas were principally sub- 
sistence farmers. 
The Zadruga and Kin Ties 
With the exception of the Slovenes, whose cultural patterns more closely 
approach those of the neighboring AustriansB than they do other Slav 
groups, one can say that large kinship groupings have been and continue 
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to be a very important feature of Yugoslav life. The term "zadruga" is 
commonly applied to the extended family group of the South Slavs, al- 
though no simple definition can embrace all the varied manifestations of 
this institution. In  Serbo-Croatian, i t  has two main meanings, the first 
being "the joint family," and the second "cooperative enterprise." The 
latter is commonly used today to refer to production and marketing units 
among farmers or organizations of groups of craftsmen. The household 
zadruga may be generally defined as a patrilineal and patrilocal extended 
family functioning as a joint production and consumption unit. Impor- 
tantly, it could also include members who were not related but were legally 
or in some cases de facto adopted into the unit.24 Mosely has defined the 
zadruga as "a household composed of two or more biological or small- 
families, closely related by blood or adoption, owning its means of produc- 
tion communally, producing and consuming its means of livelihood 
comm~nally."~~ 
Some scholars, particularly Tomasic, have attempted to distinguish be- 
tween the type of zadruga found in the lowlands, especially Croatia, and 
that of the Dinaric mountain herdsmen, as representing two contrasting 
cultural types, the "Pannonian," with a democratic gospodar as household 
chief, in contrast to the authoritarian "Dinaric" ~tareSina.~e Mosely outlines 
three regionally different types of zadrugas based on historical and ecologi- 
cal factors. The first consists of the tribal society of pre-igin Montenegro 
and northern Albania, and the second, considerably larger, includes the 
mountain systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Croatia, northern 
and central Macedonia, and central Albania. The third belt runs ir 
ly across the rolling plains and valleys of Croatia, the region of S 
pre-1912 Serbia, western and central Bulgaria, southern Macedor 
southern Albania.27 He stresses the absence of ethnic or national alneren- 
tiation in the structure and function of the varied types he studied and 
was struck, for example, by the fact that Croat, Serb, and Moslem-Slav 
zadrugas within a single area in Bosnia all showed essentially similar char- 
acteristics (aside from certain differences in religious customs and proper 
names), suggesting that the zadrugal patterns are much older than the 
religious and national traits, which developed s~bsequently.~~ This is 
further corroborated by the existence in some places of Moslems and Chris- 
tians in the same zadruga, the better to deal with changing governments. 
By destroying the Serbian medieval state and especially the urban corn- 
ponent of the existing society, the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans $9- 
erally helped perpetuate village-level institutions. I n  periods of great 
insecurity the large zadruga had many advantages as a unit of self-defense. 
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groupings.29 The zadruga was also functionally adapted to a mixed agri- 
cultural and herding economy and to the extensive pioneering efforts un- 
dertaken in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in central Serbia, 
when the Serbs began to come out of their mountain refuges and settle on 
the plains. 
The zadruga organization was adapted for military purposes by the 
a Austrians on their border with Turkey in the area of Croatia-Slavonia. 
Because the households were extended families, it was possible for able- 
bodied men to be spared for military service without endangering the 
agricultural economy of the household. They received special privileges 
for their service, including local self-government and freedom from taxa- 
tion as well as religious toleration (they were mainly Orthodox). For a 
time, they also had the right to the spoils of war. Generally speaking their 
status was superior to that of serfs who were under the domination of the 
landowners. The people inhabiting the frontier were organized into units 
[ which bore direct allegiance to the emperor. Their homesteads were con- 
sidered inalienable since they could not be sold or mortgaged.30 
Literature on the zadruga among rural groups is relatively abundant, 
and the large size i t  attained is well documented. Even today, groups of 
twenty and over can be found in parts of Bosnia, Macedonia, and the 
Kosmet. Before the war, household units of sixty or more members were 
by no means rare in many parts of the country. For urban groups there is 
less information, although i t  appears quite certain that prosperous Serbian 
merchants and craftsmen in towns maintained large households. 
Family commercial enterprises among Orthodox groups have a successful 
history in the Balkans. The major reason for this was the solidarity of kin 
1 ties, consanguineal, affinal, or artifically extended. 
Their businesses were often family aEairs, with one member of the family 
in the Balkans, another in Austria, Italy, or the Netherlands, and a third in 
Russia, Egypt, or France. Carrying on business as a family affair allowed them 
to make a more economic employment of labor by the avoidance of expensive 
middlemen or brokers, to which European merchants had to resort. Religious 
and ethnic ties, brotherhood or pobratimstvo held together these partners or 
associates who were not of the same biological family.31 
The basic social patterns of these urban merchants were derived from 
9 the rural areas from which they had originated a generation or more 
previously. 
I n  the usual type of zadruga were the household elder and his wife and 
one or more sons with their families. The power of the stardina here was 
obviously great, since i t  was that of a father over his sons and not that of 
an individual selected by general agreement on the basis of his personal 
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qualifications. The father's position was founded on one of the cardinal 
principles of behavior in traditional Serbian society, i.e. obedience toward 
one's elders, particularly the males and especially the father. The head of 
the household was expected to (and usually did) consult with the sons on 
important matters, and a son could replace his father if the latter became 
incapacitated for one reason or another. In  this case, it was usually the 
eldest brother who took over. 
Formal respect for the head of the household and older males in general 
was shown in many ways. For example, when a young boy or even a young 
adult met an older man he would take off his hat and say "Good day." 
Older people, even within the same household, were always addressed in 
the formal Vi form. A new daughter-in-law had to wash the feet of the 
male elders at the end of each day's work. When a starGina entered the 
home of a neighbor or friend the children and young adults of that house- 
hold kissed his hand as a sign of respect. The head of the household re- 
garded these acts as his due, and if anyone failed in his duties toward him 
there were often serious consequences. Despite the cultural norms there 
were some household heads who were dominated by their wives. PapuZar 
(slipper-wearer) is the Serbo-Croat term for henpecked. 
Women in peasant households played a very significant role, in contrast 
to their position in town families where their economic functions were 
decidedly secondary. The wife of the head of the zadruga planned and 
assigned special women's tasks, coordinating all women's work within the 
household. A Serbian folk saying declares that within the house the woman 
is the head and the man the guest. While the wife always publicly deferred 
to her husband, this does not mean she was never consulted or that her 
influence on her husband was negligible. Marriage was in a real sense re- 
garded as a partnership, although overlain with a formal inequality. One 
old villager reflected this attitude in describing how he progressed from a 
humble peasant to become head of a large and prosperous household, con- 
cluding, "And all this I have achieved with my baba." 
The evidence is not conclusive, but it may be that prosperous village 
households in the nineteenth century had patterns similar to those of the 
families of town merchants (the role of women being an important differ- 
ence), and perhaps the poorer urban families and the impoverished village 
families had more overt equality in the relationships within the household. 
I n  the eastern and southern areas, town merchants did, of course, attempt 
to emulate their Turkish counterparts. 
The process of modernization has greatly altered the traditional struc- 
ture of the patriarchal household in the town as well as the village. In  
OraSac, the average household size declined consistently from 8.3 individu- 
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als in 1844 to 6.9 in 1890 to 4.5 in 1953. I n  the nearby market town of 
Arandjelovac, household size dropped from 4.6 in 1890 to 2.9 in 1953.32 
This trend continues, not only for villages in Serbia but in all parts of 
Yugoslavia. Table 5 points up  the differences in average household size 
by republics and by size of community, using 1953-1961 census data. For 
1953, the largest average household size, 5.78, occurs in the smallest settle- 
ments in Macedonia, and the smallest households, 2.78 people, are found 
in the largest centers of Slovenia. When comparing these figures with those 
from 1961, we find that average household size in the large towns has barely 
altered; while for the smallest settlements, average size has decreased by 
0.34 persons per household. Significantly, the two ends of the continuum, 
Slovenia and the Kosmet, have changed least. The largest unit, Serbia 
proper, has decreased most (by 0.5 persons), followed by Bosnia (0.34 per- 
sons), reflecting the impact of industrialization on these two areas. 
Table 6 shows Yugoslav households by number of members in the years 
I 948, I 953, and I 96 I. The number with five or more members has remained 
stationary or declined progressively in proportion to the total number of 
households while those with under four members have correspondingly 
increased. I n  terms of frequency distribution, the largest number of house- 
holds are those with three to four members. However, if viewed in terms 
of the total population, it is apparent that the large household remains a 
significant factor in Yugoslav society despite the century-long decline of 
the classic zadruga. Of course, the decline in population in some categories 
is also marked, considering the general population increase. I n  1953, there 
were 546,000 people living in households of ten members and in I 96 I only 
420,000 in this category, representing a decline of more than 20 percent 
(yet the later figure is almost that of Yugoslavia's second largest city). 
Some observers have been satisfied to explain the decline of the zadruga 
and associated diminution of patriarchal authority as a consequence of 
modernization, but modernization involves more than the gradual disap 
pearance of preexisting patterns. Often the patterns are reformulated, 
certain ones becoming intensified and others taking on different functions. 
With specific reference to the zadruga, today the smaller household units 
often work harder in  many respects than formerly, since there is less spe- 
cialization and increasing overlap in what used to be a fairly strict division 
of labor between the sexes. When the head of the household is a peasant- 
worker, his wife's responsibilities become extremely burdensome. I t  is often 
only with difficulty that she can assist with agricultural chores, attend to 
regular housework and cooking, and, in addition, mind her young chil- 
dren, a task formerly assumed by their grandmother. If, however, neigh- 
bors are also kin (indeed they are often originally from the same zadruga) 
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and if relations are amicable, they may continue to cooperate closely. 
Kinship ties continue to play a very important role in migrations to cities 
and towns in most parts of the country. A classic form has been the pupil 
who continues his education beyond the village elementary school by going 
to live with relatives in town. His family supplies him with food and often 
gives extra amounts as informal payment for the child's lodging. I n  the 
prewar period, he might have been apprenticed to a craftsman who, as 
often as not, was related to the family, if only indirectly. Under present 
conditions, a job in a factory can sometimes be obtained through a relative. 
This, of course, is not done directly, but is a case where the concept of veze, 
literally connections, is pertinent. There is some indication that the institu- 
tion of workers' councils, which stress local management, encourages this 
practice, although nepotism, as such, is formally opposed by political or- 
ganizations and administrators. Kin ties appear to be less significant for 
professionals or where the place of employment is far removed from one's 
point of origin, e.g. for a Serb working in Macedonia. However, these ties 
can be extremely important for the villager who moves to the nearby 
market town or even to the provincial capital. Not infrequently, he retains 
his land in the village and receives informal rent in the form of food which 
a village relative brings to him in town. He may also return to the village 
to help with the crops during his vacation. By the same token, when a vil- 
lager has business in town, he will almost always stay with his relatives, even 
though it may be for a prolonged period. These kin ties with the village 
are, of course, not indissoluble and frequently do weaken over the genera- 
tions, but they seldom disappear within the course of a single generation or 
even two. 
Ideally, help is expected from patrilineal kin and often from godparents 
(kumovi) as well. Such artificially extended kin ties persist even among 
people who are not formally religious. Their preservation is aided by the 
fact that Yugoslavia is a relatively small country and that most movement 
occurs within republics or to neighboring republics. Permanent moves 
from one end of the country to the other are extremely rare, as the nation- 
ality distribution of the population shows, e.g. few Slovenes immigrate to 
Macedonia or vice versa, or even Montenegrins to Croatia:s but there is 
considerable movement between Bosnia and Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. 
Where there were major population movements, as in the settlement of 
many Montenegrins and Bosnians in the lands left by the Germans after 
the war, migration was generally by family groups. Many of these people 
were subsequently employed in industrial enterprises of various sorts. 
Other than temporary migrations by workers, the most significant postwar 
population movements are the continuing movement of agricultural 
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colonists to the Vojvodina and, in much smaller numbers, technicians from 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia to developing industrial sites in other areas. 
Factors in the Decline of the Family 
I n  considering changes in the family and zadruga, the role of the woman 
is extremely important. A principal reason for breakdown within zadrugas 
has been conflicts among the in-marrying women. This is easily under- 
standable since the males are related consanguineally while the women 
have only their single affinal bond and, subsequently, their tie to their 
children, which is often in direct conflict with a father-son or sibling rela- 
tionship. A frequent source of trouble was hostilities resulting from differ- 
ences in dowries, especially in land, that brides brought to the zadruga 
household. Another factor of great importance is the changing legal posi- 
tion of women reinforced by improved education, which makes it more 
likely that they will attempt to exercise those rights granted to them in the 
postwar constitution. 
A Yugoslav scholar has described the formal legal changes in the status of 
women. 
Till 1945 there were . . . three main legal systems: the former Austrian Civil 
Code from 1811 (with different amendments), the Serbian Civil Code from 
1858, and Moslem religious law. 
According to these systems, the husband was proclaimed legal head of the 
family. He directs the household, wields alone parental powers, selects the 
residence of the family; the wife takes her husband's name, obeys his orders, 
the husband is presumed to be the manager of his wife's possessions and is 
legally not responsible to her for his management, possessions acquired during 
marriage belong to the husband if not expressly stipulated otherwise, in case 
of death of the father the mother cannot be the legal guardian of her children. 
The new legal system has emphatically proclaimed the equality of women in 
all walks of life. . . . Husband and wife have the legal duty of mutual help and 
support. Questions of the household and of family-management are settled by 
agreement. Possessions acquired by economic activity of husband or wife during 
the marriage are [in] common ownership, possessions brought into the marriage 
or otherwise acquired (inheritance, etc.) belong to the partner who brought or 
acquired them. The wife is free to retain her maiden family name, or use both, 
or take the husband's. The mother has equal parental rights with the father. 
In case of death of the father she is the legal guardian of the children.84 
I n  addition to legal changes, the status of women as wage earners has 
altered. Between 1952 and 1959, the percentage of employed women be- 
tween the ages of 15 and 60 doubled, to 14 percent, and women constituted 
about one quarter of the nonagricultural labor force (excluding agriculture 
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and handicrafts). The percentage of working wives increased from 18 per- 
cent in 1953 to 23 percent in 1959.95 During the period 1956-1963, the 
number of employed women grew to a proportionately greater extent than 
did the total labor force. This is particularly striking in the more tradition- 
tied areas such as Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. 
I n  a textile mill in Macedonia in an area where working wives coped 
with time-consuming household chores and lack of adequate child-care 
facilities, the workers' council formed a commission to find out how female 
employees spent their leisure time. Of the thirty women included in the 
inquiry, only one was found resting when visited by the commission. The 
others were busy cooking, cleaning, or doing laundry. I n  order to assist 
women workers, working collectives opened workers' restaurants to sell 
prepared food at lower prices. The report concludes, however, that much 
more remains to be done to free women to develop their labor potential. 
One of the most urgent problems is the care of children while mothers are 
at work.38 
The changing status of women is also evident in their mobility through 
marriage. They continue to remain disadvantaged in education, but mar- 
riage does offer a way to leave the village or become involved in a non- 
agricultural household. A survey conducted during 1956-1958 found that 
although 98 percent of farmers married women with a similar background, 
only 75 percent of the peasant girls married villagers engaged in agricul- 
ture; 6 percent married skilled workmen and craftsmen, and others married 
white-collar employees.37 Although peasant women are in general more 
mobile than men, i t  should be noted that their individual potentiality is 
less. For example, the chances of a peasant's sdn obtaining a university 
education are greater than those of a peasant's daughter. 
Many of the strains within the nuclear family and in extended family 
and kin relationships can be traced to the great value attached to educa- 
tion and the generally lower educational level of adults compared with 
children, women with men, and rural inhabitants contrasted with town 
dwellers. The general level of education of mothers is considerably below 
that of fathers, and figures from the 1953 census show that the average 
education of the family head is below the national average. In 56 percent 
of families, wives have no schooling, while an additional 35 percent have 
been only to elementary school. Further, a significant number of younger 
people who have a secondary or higher education have only now begun to 
found families38 Generally they many late and have few children, the 
pattern resembling that of the American middle class during the thirties. 
This is in part due to the severe apartment shortage in urban areas. 
When a child of a peasant family attains more than an elementary school 
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education, this usually implies that he has left the village and, by extension, 
has adopted a completely new cultural pattern. This is almost universally 
the case in the eastern and southern parts of Yugoslavia. Significantly, par- 
ents, who often must make great sacrifices to get their children out of the 
village, are frequently treated in a harsh and condescending way by their 
children who have become self-conscious about their humble origins. Par- 
ents often support children who are students until they are well into their 
twenties, sending cash, parcels of food, or both. Although the children of 
civil servants and skilled workers are much more highly represented in 
the gymnasia (the high schools which lead to the universities), many chil- 
dren of peasants enter vocational schools, teacher training schools, and 
agricultural institutes. As a number of Yugoslav investigators have pointed 
out, the great social transition is from an agricultural to a nonagricultural 
occupational pattern. Transitions from manual to nonmanual and higher- 
status occupations are easier with respect to family life. Family ties are 
strained the most in the transition from agricultural to nonagricultural 
occupations, when one's childhood background must be explicitly rejected. 
Someone entering government service or a socially owned enterprise must 
put aside not only the pattern of traditional beliefs and practices associated 
with village life, but also the point of view of the individual peasant 
entrepreneur in a socialist state. 
Despite the enhanced formal status of women in postwar Yugoslavia, 
traditional attitudes about women on the part of urban people have by no 
means disappeared. These are reinforced by the fact that the schooling of 
the wife has lagged significantly behind that of her husband, a pattern 
which has continued up to the present. Of couples marrying in 1962, in 
those cases where the husband had elementary schooling, approximately 
20 percent of the wives had no schooling, while where the husband had 
some degree of middle schooling (eighth grade or better) 44 percent of the 
wives had elementary schooling or less; among those with university or 
higher education, only about 28 percent of the wives matched their hus- 
band's education. Significantly, only among men with no schooling were 
approximately one third of the wives better educated, while where the men 
had an elementary school education the percentage of better-educated 
wives fell to 6 percent and to 2 percent in cases where the husband had 
some degree of middle schooling. The greatest educational inferiority 
among women is found where men have had elementary school or uni- 
versity-level education. These statistics appear to indicate that the highest 
approach to equality in educational background is precisely among the 
group from which the greatest number of working wives is drawn. Those 
wives who have no schooling or only an elementary education can be as- 
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sumed to be in the main either the wives of private farmers or peasant- 
workers and occupied with their tasks at home and on the land (two thirds 
of all women marrying), while the female labor force possessing some de- 
gree of skill is increasingly being drawn from the middle group. That is, 
the working wife who has the best chance of approaching her husband's 
educational status and earning power is from this group, since those cases 
where both husband and wife are professionals form a very small propor- 
tion of the labor force. This group is, of course, very significantly different 
from the population as a whole, with the educational gap significantly 
narrowed. Age at marriage, however, continues to be younger for women 
than for their husbands (in 1962 70 percent of the women and only 45 
percent of the men were age 25 or under at the time of marriage).39 
Milovan Djilas in  his critical essays on the Yugoslav elite wrote on the 
problems which great social mobility imposed on the wives of high gov- 
ernment officials. The husbands had entered the wide world of interna- 
tional politics while the wives remained tied to traditional family interests. 
Their inability to make the transition resulted in a number of divorces. 
Statistics show that such problems occur commonly. Among those seeking 
divorce in 1962 the men averaged more years of education than the wom- 
enP0 Although agriculturalists compose by far the largest occupational 
group (about four times the number of industrial workers, according to 
the 1961 census) the number of workers involved in divorce proceedings 
(according to the occupation of the husband) is about 20  percent higher 
than among agriculturalists. Divorces among professional people are one 
third the number of those among agriculturalists even though their abso- 
lute numbers in the population are but a small fraction of the latter. 
Divorce rates are lowest in the least developed areas; for example the rate 
per thousand is 1.5 for Serbia, 0.4 for the Kosmet, and 0.6 for MacedoniaP1 
I t  seems logical to infer that the greatest transformations in family 
relationships are occurring among rural migrants with some degree of 
education above the elementary level. One might add that these transfor- 
mations are occurring in areas where opportunities for nonagricultural 
employment are greatest, in towns and particularly in the more rapidly 
developing republics such as Serbia, with burgeoning Belgrade as a prime 
example. 
An Overuiew of Modernization & Illustrated by Primers 
I n  viewing the process of modernization, the foreign observer is looking 
in from the outside. However, the outsider has the advantage of a de- 
tached viewpoint and the possibility of seeing overall patterns. At the same 
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time, i t  is crucial to know what are the ideals of the culture with respect 
to change as seen by those on the inside. One important aspect of this is 
the indoctrination of youth. As an interesting means of depicting the 
modernization process, the following section surveys first-grade primers 
used in the different republics during the years 1952 to 1964. These primers 
were all produced locally. The life styles depicted vary, as do the teaching 
techniques, the illustrative material, and the quality of the books them- 
selves, but they all have a common ideology. The lessons are obviously 
I limited by the pedagogical considerations in introducing reading and 
writing to first graders, but they illustrate well the ideal behavior patterns 
and official values. This analysis will concentrate on visual materials, pri- 
marily from a qualitative point of view. This, too, naturally has limitations, 
representing as i t  does local adults' attempts to present the lessons in a 
manner meaningful to seven-year-olds and at the same time socially and 
politically approved. I t  is possible to see, however, the nature of the world 
to which the children are being introduced. 
In  all of the primers dating from the 19509s, the period of consolidation 
( of the national state, national identification is presented in the form of a 
frontispiece photograph of Tito, invariably in the uniform of marshal of 
the Yugoslav armed forces. I n  most of the photographs he is stern and un- 
smiling, the classic picture of an authoritarian figure. By the 1960's he is 
more often pictured in civilian dress, still the essence of solidity and leader- 
ship, but definitely more benign. A theme which has become predominant 
1 in the later readers is that of Tito entertaining children. In  the 1964 primer 
for Croatia, his photograph has been omitted entirely, while the most 
recent primer from Slovenia, a republic felt to be more conservative politi- 
cally, presents a line drawing of Tito as a Partisan. Characteristically, the 
I Albanian primer, printed by a special publishing house in Belgrade for use 
in the Kosmet and parts of Macedonia, continues the stern-faced marshal 
unaltered. The earlier books contain plentiful references to the Partisan 
struggle and the role of children as young pioneers helping to build social- 
ism. For example, the 1952 primer for Serbia contains the text of a song 
honoring Tito as the wartime savior of the country, and following pages 
include illustrated stories of young boys and girls working to build canals 
I and railroads and a picture of a Partisan leader who died a heroic death. 
I Youth construction activities continue to appear in the 1964 edition, now 
I focusing on road-building, with a sketch of young workers welcoming Tito 
to the road on which they have worked. I n  another picture, children cele- 
brate Army Day, with the captions "Long Live the Yugoslav Army!" and 
"Long Live Comrade Tito!" Significant is a picture of children playing 
I war, the moral of the text being defense of one's homeland. The closest 
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the Croatian reader comes to this type of theme is a picture of children 
visiting a warship which travels to many places. Here the text concludes 
"Long Live our Sai7orsl" The 1961 Slovene reader has several lessons using 
the Partisans, Tito, patriotic holidays, and even a story about a young man 
going off to army service, but no mention of youth construction projects 
(Croatia and Slovenia being the two most developed republics). 
Since the historic traditions of each area are significantly different and 
since the Yugoslav Communist movement developed principally during the 
war, it is understandable that patriotic references should be focused on the 
person of Tito and subsidiary heroes of the resistance period. (It should 
be mentioned that in later grades the children do study figures connected 
with individual literary traditions; for example Slovene pupils learn about 
their nineteenth-century nationalist poet PreSeren, and Serbian and Mon- 
tenegrin children study their important nationalistic literary figures Vuk 
KaradiiE and the poet-prince NjegoS.) 
All the primers stress themes of economic development. The emphasis is 
on constructive activity-building factories, mechanizing the countryside- 
as opposed to recreation. The value of play is introduced only in connec- 
tion with specific institutionalized holidays: young pioneers go on an 
outing to celebrate on the First of May; children dance around a decorated 
New Year's Tree (these are the state substitutions for Easter and Christ- 
mas)P2 
In keeping with the emphasis on economic development the father is 
usually pictured as an industrial worker and, reflecting the increasingly 
common situation, he is shown returning to his home in a rural setting, 
implicitly a village. Many pictures of factories show wheat or other crops 
being harvested in nearby fields. 
All household activity is purposeful. Children, boys especially, are shown 
studying. Girls study or help with the cooking. Mother is always shown 
cooking, cleaning, or knitting, and Father typically reads a newspaper. 
A common motif throughout all the books for all years is the family 
grouped around a table, the father reading, children doing their lessons, 
and the mother knitting. There is also a strong emphasis on personal hy- 
giene. Cleanliness and literacy are part of the East European concept of 
kultur, so that people who are kulturni are not necessarily those with a 
refined education but individuals who are clean and can read. Invariably 
the verb "to wash oneself' is worked into.the lesson. There may be sound 
linguistic reasons for this but water pitchers and basins frequently appear 
in the pictures. A c o q o n  theme is proper treatment of illness, exempli- 
fied by consultation with a doctor and use of bottled medicine. All of 
which serves to emphasize the stress placed on hygiene. 
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The consistent emphasis on the value of literacy is not surprising. In 
some peasant homes in less advanced parts of the country, the small child 
with his primer is the first member of the household to have formal school- 
ing. In most cases where the village parents have had minimal schooling, 
the child's education opens a path of mobility which will eventually enable 
him to work outside the village. Schooling is regarded not as an ordinary 
part of childhood but as a tool to be used to bring about a better life. 
Another example of valued behavior is equality of the sexes. Men and 
women are pictured working side by side in the factory and participating 
in heavy construction work in rural areas. Boys and girls work together in 
school and on youth construction projects. 
Relatively little space (with the marked exception of the Albanian read- 
ers) is devoted to anthropomorphic animal stories, and, of course, there are 
no tales of kings or beautiful princesses. In most cases, the emphasis is un- 
swervingly on realism. Homes are shown with an occasional crack in the 
wall. People doing hard work wear old clothes, sometimes patched. In the 
illustrated alphabet sections of some of the primers, along with fruits, toys, 
farm equipment, and household items, familiar objects selected to ex- 
emplify sounds include rat, wasp, and snout. 
The earlier primers place no emphasis on clothing as such, other than 
as being part of a generally neat appearance. (An interesting note, how- 
ever, is that the teacher is always shown wearing a tie.) A decade later there 
is definite stress on clothing and accessories, on getting dressed up for some 
special event, and on grooming that appears to exceed the good health 
habits classification. Wristwatches frequently appear. In the 1963 reader 
for Bosnia, an impeccably dressed father and son set out to visit a relative, 
presumably in the village. On the opposite page, a man goes hunting 
dressed in fashionable sports attire, complete with special hat and hunting 
jacket. 
The style of illustrations has improved over the years from generally 
crude, static representations to bright, sharp, often imaginatively rendered 
drawings. Quality aside, the illustrations offer an excellent opportunity for 
a comparison of idealized standards of living. For example, one lesson 
shows an interior scene of grandparents listening to their grandson read 
from his primer. In the 1952 Serbian book, all three are seated on low 
stools against a vague background. Eleven years later, Grandfather, put- 
ting down his newspaper, sits back in a big easy chair; Grandmother, still 
with her knitting, sits in a chair with a back. The room contains a modern 
cabinet with a shelf of books, and a bright rug on the floor completes the 
picture. 
Apparent in most recent editions are significant signs of transition to a 
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stage of assured industrial development. In  most of the new books, earlier 
themes of socialist construction and Partisan offensives have been replaced 
by scenes of consumption of goods and even of leisure. There has been an 
increase in animal stories, and the new Bosnian reader actually contains 
a fairy tale. In  the earlier books, the village is depicted as the place where 
most children live. In recent ones, it is shown more and more as the place 
where one goes to visit older relatives or to hunt and fish. The newer books 
have unquestionably become more urban-oriented. 
Of course, significant differences among the republics remain. Self- 
images and views of each other are important. For example, in the 1964 
Croatian book, the Serbo-Croatian consonant form dE, found in many 
nouns of Turkish origin, is illustrated by a picture and text about "our 
good friends in Bosnia," two boys whose names start with this sound. A 
typical Bosnian Moslem village scene is depicted, with the mother dressed 
in full baggy trousers and with steep-roofed Moslem village houses in the 
background. It is interesting that in the Bosnian book, the same sound is 
introduced by the noncommital word "diak," or sack, and that nowhere 
throughout this reader is there any hint of the differences among the three 
major ethnic-religious groups who live in Bosnia. 
The primers mirror an impressive degree of economic development and 
considerable intellectual liberalization, which has enabled them to emerge 
both artistically and in content from their earlier sterile socialist realism. 
Despite these definite trends, however, even the more recent readers, when 
compared with the fun-and-games-in-suburbia approach of so many Ameri- 
can primers, remain serious and ideologically oriented. 
Modernization is a continuing process of adaptation to an ever-evolving 
technology, as inhabitants of the most developed industrial states have 
discovered. In Yugoslavia its impact on various age, sex, nationality, and 
occupational groups has been uneven. Some generalizations are possible, 
however. The most dramatic transformations in the initial phases of in- 
dustrialization are taking place among present villagers and those who 
have left the village. Traditional peasant methods of cultivation sanctioned 
by the yearly round of ceremonies and individual small-scale marketing at 
weekly town fairs are, in the long run, manifestly incompatible with mod- 
ern technology and the increasing consumer demands of expanding urban 
centers. Undoubtedly, as the rural-urban transition progresses, the focus 
will be on the town as the primary arena of change. The reformulation of 
village life and peasant subculture has just begun to make its impact on 
the more conservative town. Toward the end of the century, we will no 
doubt be seeing a further stage in the process of modernization (or perhaps 
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by then the term will have become obsolete). Once initiated into life in 
town, without firm ties to a historic tradition, the ex-peasant will begin to 
influence even more profoundly the nature of traditional urban life. Pre- 
viously, when the influx was smaller, it was possible to incorporate the 
ex-villager into the professional occupations and urban trades when he 
modified his manners, speech, and values to accord with those of the domi- 
nant classes. But tomorww and even today this is no longer practicable; 
values are changing, and those which exist are set by mass education and 
the mass media. The Yugoslav revolution introduced a new ideology, but 
it is only a minority who have developed a strong ideological commitment 
as opposed to a career commitment. Increased and diversified consumer 
goods and associated living standards still are significant aspirations for a 
good proportion of the urban population, whether it is a question of secur- 
ing an adequate apartment, a car, or an education for one's children. 
Beyond this, there is the question of what distinctive features will char- 
acterize the process of modernization in Yugoslavia. One of these appears 
to be decentralization, a result of historical patterns of population distribu- 
tion as much as of conscious planning. 
Exactly how the question of ethnic diversity will be manifested in urban 
life is difficult to predict. Ethnic rivalries will doubtless continue, but they 
may well develop more in the direction of competing regional economic 
interest groups than specific socioeconomic groups having particular sub- 
cultural identities. A prime example is the Serb-Croat relationship. The 
prewar program of the Croatian Peasant Party is largely irrelevant in terms 
of today's industrialization. I t  is no longer a question of making rural life 
more attractive as a solution to Yugoslavia's nationality problem. Much 
more important, considering the actual and potential surplus of labor in 
the countryside and, to a lesser extent, in the town, is the problem of main- 
taining channels of mobility so that increasingly greater segments of the 
population will be able to enjoy the fruits of industrialization. There is 
already ample evidence of this economic conflict in the allocation of finite 
resources for the construction of factories and apartment houses. With so 
few young people visualizing a future on the land or in the village, this 
problem may become acute. Doubtless certain subcultural differences will 
persist in interpersonal relationships and, to some extent, in general value 
systems, but by and large these are subordinate to modern technological 
imperatives. One can observe great diversity in peasant housing, costumes, 
customs, language, and family structure from village to village. These dif- 
ferences have developed over long periods of time. A modern city, even 
one with well-developed historic traditions, does not foster such diversifica- 
tion. A new settlement of urban workers in Zagreb or Belgrade may have 
TABLE 1 
Private Agricultural Households 
By Number, Size, and Occupation of Members, 1960 














Employed outside holding 
Size of Holdings (in Hectares) 
Total to .I .l to .5 .5 to 1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-8 8-10 Over lo* 
Private holdings are limited by law to l o  hectares except when some is in woods or pastures or when households are exceptionally large. 
t Mainly households with gardens, the produce of which is not marketed. 
Source: Statistitki goditnjak SFR], 1964. godina XI.  p. 164. 
Some Economic and Social Indicators, by Republic 
Serbia Bosnia and Monte- 
Serbia Proper* Vojvodina* Kosmet* Croatia Herzegovina Slovenia Macedonia negro Yugoslavia 
Population 
(in 000) (1961) 
Salaried pop. 
(in 000) (1962) 
Salaried women 
(in 000) (1962) 
Economic 
organizations (1 96 1) 
Apartments 
(in 000) (1961) 
Elementary school 
pupils (in 000) 
(1961-62) 
Students completing 
university in 1962 
Suicides 
(1961) 
No. 7,642 4,823 1,853 
% 41.2 26.0 10.0 
No. 1,300 792 428 
% 37.8 23.1 12.4 
No. 355 214 129 
% 35.5 21.4 12.9 
No. 6,923 3,965 2,528 
% 35.0 20.0 12.8 
No. 554 333 190 
% 41.7 25.1 14.3 
No. 1,165 617 280 
% 40.2 24.8 9.7 
No. 12,339 11,135 1,003 
% 53.9 48.6 4.4 
No. 924 502 384 
% 42 22 17 
. . 
+ Included in total for Serbia. 
Sources: Statistical Pocketbook of Yugoslavia, 1963, p. 23. Statistitki godisnjak SIiRJ, 1,963, pp. 350, 351, 364, 472. 474, 479, 346. 
Changes in Average Household Size from 1953 to 1961, 
By Size of Settlements and Republics 
Size of Settlements 
2,000- 3,000- 5,000- 10,000- 20,000- 30,000- 50,000 
2,999 4,999 9,999 19,999 29,999 49,999 and  over 













Serbia proper 4.59 -.5 4.23 - 3 7  3.92 - 3 5  3.18 -.03 3.17 .O 3.39 -.01 2.92 -.I4 
Vojvodina 3.83 - 2 7  3.84 - 3 1  3.61 -.23 3.34 -.14 3.03 -.l 3.13 -.09 2.83 -.06 
Kosmet 5.47 +.06 5.67 -.02 5.45 +.I2 4.88 -.I2 4.71 +.08 4.27 -.07 - - 
Croatia 3.84 -.21 3.47 -.13 3.17 +.03 3.22 -.08 3.05 +.03 2.92 -.07 2.84 -.01 
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Slovenia 3.15+.02 3.11 -.09 2.86 +.06 3.05 -.24 2.84 +.04 - - 2.78 + .I 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina 5.08 - 3 4  4.40 -.44 3.68 -.01 3.91 -.07 - - 3.32 - .03 3.40 - .17 
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Montenegro* 3.76 + -31 2.94 + .26 3.70 + .2 3.80 + .18 3.43 -.02 - - - - 
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In Montenegro the increases are due to strong patriarchal tradition, a high rate of natural increase, and the fact that this republic has 
the fewest urban centers, in size and number, in all Yugoslavia. 
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Belgrade. 
Yugoslav Households, by Number of Members 
Total Number of Members 11 
Year Households 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 and over 
1948 No. 3,609,725 451,184 509,353 560,937 574,994 492,780 372,337 250,987 156,855 93,418 53,703 93,177 
% 100.0 12.5 14.1 15.5 15.9 '13.7 10.3 7.0 4.3 2.6 1.5 2.6 
1953 No. 3,945,287 480,203 566.936 677,420 665,011 537,189 396,029 259,509 158,076 93,294 54,592 87,028 
% 100.0 12.2 14.4 16.4 16.9 13.6 10.0 6.6 4.0 2.4 1.3 2.2 
1961 No. 4,648,563 630,128 715,283 801,257 865,821 635,553 428,576 249,424 137,281 75,295 41,959 67,986 
% 100.0 13.6 15.4 17.2 18.6 13.7 9.2 5.4 3.0 1.6 .8 1.5 
Source: StatistiEki godifnjak SFRJ, 1964, Table 108-5, p. 85. 
